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Absichtliche Beschleunigung des Todeseintritts bei
Behandlungsverzicht und -abbruch
Zusammenfassung. Zweck: Diese Arbeit soll empi-
rische Daten zur Absicht des Arztes beim Behandlungs-
verzicht und -abbruch liefern und deren mögliche Bedeu-
tung für die ethische Debatte diskutieren.
Methodik: Die präsentierten Daten basieren auf
EURELD, einem breit angelegten Forschungsprojekt zur
Erfassung medizinischer Entscheidungen am Lebens-
ende in sechs europäischen Ländern. Ausgehend von
einer fortlaufenden Zufallsstichprobe von Todesfallformu-
laren war der zuständige Arzt anonym schriftlich zu den
am Lebensende des Verstorbenen getroffenen Entschei-
dungen befragt worden.
Ergebnisse: In allen sechs Ländern zusammenge-
nommen gaben die befragten Ärzte in 45% aller Fälle von
Behandlungsverzicht oder -abbruch am Lebensende eine
ausdrückliche Absicht zur Beschleunigung des Todesein-
trittes an. Höher als der Durchschnitt war dieser Prozent-
satz in der Schweiz und in Schweden (52% resp. 51%),
tiefer in Dänemark und Belgien (36% resp. 38%), im Mittel-
feld lagen Italien und Holland (42% resp. 45%). Insgesamt
war der Entscheid zum Verzicht oder Abbruch einer Dia-
lyse oder einer Beatmung besonders häufig mit einer
ausdrücklichen Absicht zur Beschleunigung des Todes-
eintrittes verbunden (57% resp. 54%), der Verzicht oder
Abbruch von Krebstherapien besonders selten (34%).
Schlussfolgerungen: Ärztliche Entscheidungen zum
Behandlungsverzicht oder -abbruch am Lebensende er-
folgen in fast der Hälfte der Fälle mit der ausdrücklichen
Absicht einer Beschleunigung des Todeseintrittes. Es fin-
det sich keine klare Assoziation zwischen der ausdrück-
lichen Absicht zur Beschleunigung des Todeseintrittes
und objektiven Merkmalen des jeweiligen Behandlungs-
abbruches oder -verzichtes wie der Wahrscheinlichkeit
resp. dem Ausmaß eines lebensverkürzenden Effekts,
der Unmittelbarkeit des Todeseintritts oder der zu erwar-
tenden Belastung durch die mögliche lebenserhaltende
Maßnahme. Diese Resultate wecken Zweifel an der
Brauchbarkeit des Kriteriums der ärztlichen Absicht bei
der moralischen Beurteilung von Entscheidungen zum
Behandlungsverzicht und -abbruch.
Summary. Purpose: This study aims to provide em-
pirical data on physicians’ intentions in withholding and
withdrawing treatment, and to discuss possible implica-
tions for the ethical debate.
Basic procedures: The data presented come from
EURELD, a large research project designed to investi-
gate medical end-of-life decisions in six European coun-
tries. A continuous random sample of death certificates
formed the basis for contacting doctors who had attended
the deceased; the doctors were asked to complete, strict-
ly anonymously, mail questionnaires on the decisions
taken at the end of their patients’ lives.
Main findings: In the six countries studied, physicians
reported they had the explicit intention of hastening the
end of life in 45% of all treatments that were withheld/
withdrawn. The highest numbers of cases with an under-
lying intention of hastening the end of life were found in
Switzerland and Sweden (52% and 51%, respectively);
the lowest figures came from Denmark and Belgium (36%
and 38%). Middle-ranking countries were Italy (42%) and
the Netherlands (45%). Overall, dialysis and respiration
were comparatively more often forgone with the explicit
intent to hasten the end of life (57% and 54%, respective-
ly), whereas a particularly low percentage of cases with
such an explicit intention was found for oncotherapy
(34%).
Principal conclusions: In almost every second case, a
medical decision to withhold or withdraw treatment is
taken with the explicit intention of hastening the end of
the patient’s life. No clear association can be found be-
tween the intent to hasten the end of life and features of
the treatment forgone that can be determined objectively,
such as the likelihood and extent of a life-shortening
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effect, the immediacy of death, or the expected burden of
any potential life-sustaining measure. The findings of the
study challenge the usefulness of doctors’ intentions with
regard to hastening the end of life as criteria for moral
judgements on decisions to withhold or withdraw medical
treatment.
Key words: Euthanasia, withholding treatment, dou-
ble effect, medical ethics, questionnaires.
Introduction
In any medical action with the potential to hasten the
end of a patient’s life, the doctor’s intent is crucial from
both the ethical and legal points of view. Depending on
whether the doctor merely had to accept the hastened
death as an unavoidable but unintentional side effect of
the therapy, or whether he/she explicitly intended such
acceleration, the administration of a drug with the poten-
tial to hasten death is classed as indirect or direct active
euthanasia, respectively [1]. The former is usually seen
as an acceptable action and is not illegal, whereas the
latter would in principle carry a jail sentence in most
westernized countries. This juridical approach is based
on the so-called doctrine of double effect that comes
from Catholic moral theology [2]. The Netherlands and
Belgium are the only two countries in the world where
the intentional ending of a patient’s life can also be legal,
provided the act was carried out at the explicit request of
the patient.
In recent years a number of empirical studies have
been published in several European countries on the oc-
currence of, and the conditions associated with, indirect
and direct active euthanasia [3–5]. The ethical debate has
considered these findings in full and discussed them in-
tensely. The result has been a wide range of sometimes
diametrically opposed conclusions [2, 6, 7]. Although this
debate has focused on active measures such as the admin-
istration of opioids and/or sedatives, intentions also play a
role in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
medical treatment. The distinction between direct (intend-
ed) and indirect (merely accepted) hastening of death and
the doctrine of double effect, is thus also applicable in the
context of withholding/withdrawing treatment [2, 8].
However, empirical data on doctors’ intentions when with-
holding and withdrawing treatment are still scarce. Apart
from a few general findings presented in the broader
context of two nationwide studies on medical end-of-life
decisions in Holland and Belgium [4, 9], we are aware of
very few reliable data from Europe on this subject.
The aims of this article are to provide a detailed
overview of data on doctors’ intentions in withholding and
withdrawing treatment, drawn from a large empirical
study on medical decision-making at the end of life, and to
discuss possible implications for the ethical debate.
Methods
The data presented in this study come from EURELD, a
large empirical research project designed to investigate medical
end-of-life decisions in six European countries. Large random
samples of death certificates formed the basis for contacting
doctors who had attended the deceased before death, and the
doctors were asked to complete a mail questionnaire in a strict-
ly anonymous manner. Approval by a research ethics commit-
tee was obtained in each country where this was required:
Belgium, Italy, and Sweden, [10]. The detailed methodology
and the main findings of the principal categories of medical
end-of-life decisions have been published elsewhere [5, 11].
The EURELD investigation was based on a questionnaire
that had been used successfully in two earlier Dutch studies and
in one in Belgium [4, 6, 12]. An English version of this ques-
tionnaire was scrutinized by all the members of the EURELD
consortium: medical doctors, epidemiologists, ethicists and so-
ciologists, many of whom had long-standing experience in end-
of-life research. Where necessary, phrasing of the questions
was adapted to the international focus of the EURELD project.
The questionnaire was then translated into the languages of the
countries involved. A standardized procedure, including an in-
Table 1. Explicit intention vs simple acceptance of hastening the end of life according to different types of treatment forgone
(withheld/withdrawn) in six European countries
Total treatments forgone Treatments withheld Treatments withdrawn
in all six countries (n = 9407) in all six countries (n = 5612) in all six countries (n = 3795)
Type of treatment Hastening Hastening Hastening Hastening Hastening Hastening
the end of the end of the end of the end of the end of the end of
life explicitly life accept- life explicitly life accept- life explicitly life accept-
intended ed but not intended ed but not intended ed but not
intended intended intended
Medication 43 57 51 49 38 62
Hydration/Nutrition 49 51 50 50 46 54
Respiration 54 46 49 51 66 34
Oncotherapy 34 66 34 66 34 66
Surgery 44 56 44 56 46 54
Dialysis 57 43 51 49 69 31
General 43 57 43 57 44 56
Total treatments 45 55 48 52 41 59
Data are weighted row percentages, rounded to whole numbers.
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dependent back-translation by a native English speaker and
comparison of this version with the original questionnaire, was
used to ensure the accuracy of the translation. Preliminary tests
with doctors working in clinical practice were carried out in
each participating country to ensure the validity of the ques-
tionnaire in the different national settings before the definitive
international text was agreed on.
In the definitive version of the EURELD questionnaire,
doctors were asked whether they had withheld or withdrawn a
treatment taking into account that this would probably or cer-
tainly hasten the end of the patient’s life. For all affirmative
answers, which were classified as non-treatment decisions, an
additional question asked whether or not the doctor took the
decision with the explicit intention of hastening the end of life.
A footnote indicated that “hastening the end of life” included
“not prolonging life”. The doctor was also asked to specify the
treatments which had been withheld or withdrawn.
Results
The response rates for the EURELD questionnaire
were 59% in Belgium, 62% in Denmark, 44% in Italy,
75% in the Netherlands, 61% in Sweden and 67% in
Switzerland. Information on the doctor’s intent was avail-
able for 9368 of the total 9407 treatments where the
attending physician had taken into account that withhold-
ing/withdrawal would probably or certainly have a life-
shortening effect.
In the six countries studied, physicians reported they
had the explicit intention of hastening death in 45% of all
potentially life-prolonging treatments that were withheld/
withdrawn (Table 1). The types of treatment forgone with
a high intent to hasten death were dialysis (57%) and
respiration (54%); a particularly low number of cases with
such an explicit intention was found for oncotherapy
(34%).
Overall, an explicit intention was more common in
withholding (48%) than in withdrawing (41%) treatment,
mainly because in the medication group – which account-
ed for almost half of all treatments forgone [11] – intent to
hasten the end of life was clearly more common when a
treatment was not started (51%) than when it was stopped
later (38%). On the other hand, in the respiration and the
dialysis categories, an explicit intention of hastening the
end of life was found more often when treatment was
withdrawn than when it was withheld.
Regarding the differences between the countries stud-
ied, the highest numbers of cases with an underlying
intention of hastening death were found in Switzerland
and Sweden (52% and 51%, respectively – Table 2); the
lowest figures came from Denmark and Belgium (36%
and 38%). Middle-ranking countries were Italy (42%) and
the Netherlands (45%).
In each of the six countries, decisions to forgo dialysis
and respiration were more likely to be taken with an
explicit intention of hastening death than a decision to
forgo oncotherapy (dialysis – ranging from 54% in Bel-
gium and Switzerland to 71% in Sweden; respiration –
ranging from 43% in Belgium to 64% in the Netherlands;
oncotherapy – ranging from 16% in Denmark to 41% in
Switzerland).
Discussion
This is the first article providing a detailed overview
of European doctors’ intentions with regard to withhold-
ing or withdrawing treatment at the end of their patients’
lives.
Comparison with results of earlier studies
Our study’s finding that the decision to withhold or
withdraw potentially life-prolonging treatment was made
with the explicit intention of hastening the end of life in
almost half the cases (45%) is in line with results of
similar studies carried out earlier in the Netherlands and
Table 2. Explicit intention vs simple acceptance of hastening the end of life according to different types of treatment forgone in
each of the six European countries studied
Type of Treatments Treatments Treatments Treatments Treatments Treatments
treatment forgone in forgone in forgone in forgone in the forgone in forgone in
Belgium Denmark Italy Netherlands Sweden Switzerland
(n = 1517) (n = 1111) (n = 233) (n = 3131) (n = 1094) (n = 2321)
int. acc. int. acc. int. acc. int. acc. int. acc. int. acc.
Medication 36 64 30 70 56 44 46 54 43 57 52 48
Hydration/ 43 57 44 56 32 68 45 55 60 40 57 43
Nutrition
Respiration 43 57 60 40 *  * 64 36 58 42 56 44
Oncotherapy 31 69 16 84 *  * 32 68 28 72 41 59
Surgery 28 72 36 64 *  * 45 55 51 49 54 46
Dialysis 54 46 61 39 *  * 60 40 71 29 54 46
General 37 63 39 61 63 37 37 63 46 54 53 47
Total 38 62 36 64 42 58 45 55 51 49 52 48
treatments
Data are weighted row percentages, rounded to whole numbers. int. Hastening the end of life explicitly intended; acc. hastening
the end of life accepted but not intended. * Small numbers of cases (fewer than 10 unweighted cases) therefore percentages not
calculated.
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Belgium. From the data reported by van der Maas and co-
workers, it can be concluded that in the Netherlands in
1990 there was an explicit intent to hasten the end of life
in more than one-third of the decisions to forgo life-
prolonging treatment [9]. Deliens and co-workers reported
on the 16.4% of all deaths in Flanders, Belgium, in 1998
that occurred after withholding or withdrawing potentially
life-prolonging treatment: 6.7% were decided on with no
intention of hastening death, 3.9% with the additional
intention, and 5.8% with the explicit intention of hasten-
ing death [4]. Neither of these studies provided any infor-
mation on intention related to the type of treatment for-
gone.
Intention of hastening death in different types of
treatment forgone
Our study results show higher proportions of explicit
intention of hastening the end of life in decisions to forgo
dialysis and respiration, and a lower proportion for with-
holding/withdrawing oncotherapy; remarkably, this was
seen in each of the six countries studied, although at
different levels. It is difficult to interpret these findings
conclusively but certain speculative comments can be
made.
One assumption could be that an explicit intention
was reported especially in those cases of forgone treat-
ment where the life-shortening effect was not only possi-
ble but almost certain. The study provides no direct infor-
mation on this. However, doctors were asked to indicate
by how much a life had been shortened in consequence of
the treatment forgone. This showed that the highest per-
centages of cases with a life-shortening effect of more
than one month were for dialysis and oncotherapy [11],
thus there is no obvious relationship between the extent to
which life was shortened and the reported intention of
hastening death. In addition to the likelihood and the
extent of a death-hastening effect, one could assume the
immediacy of death as a consequence of the decision to
withhold or withdraw treatment to be associated with an
explicit intention. Although it is not easy to relate “imme-
diacy of death” to the categories of treatment forgone that
we have used, the effect of forgoing dialysis or respiration
might be viewed as particularly immediate, especially
when an established treatment is stopped. A possible asso-
ciation with “immediacy of death” could explain the high
percentages of explicit intention in the respiration and the
dialysis categories, in particular when these treatments are
withdrawn.
On the other hand, the more adverse effects associat-
ed with a treatment, the more likely it seems that the main
intent of the decision to forgo this treatment was to spare
the patient the burden of treatment (and not primarily to
hasten the end of life). The assumption that many onco-
therapies today still have serious adverse effects could
partly explain the low percentage of explicit intention in
this category.
With regard to the differences in explicit intention
from country to country, we did not find any conclusive
explanation for the fact that doctors in Switzerland and
Sweden reported an explicit intent to hasten death more
often than doctors in Denmark and Belgium. It might be
expected that the number of non-treatment decisions when
death was deliberately hastened would be higher in those
countries where the intentional hastening of death is more
common when administering drugs to patients at the end
of life. However, our data do not support this hypothesis.
Among the EURELD countries, the intentional adminis-
tration of lethal drugs is comparatively common in the
Netherlands and Belgium [5] – both countries in which
the proportion of intentional hastening of death in non-
treatment decisions was not especially high.
Intent to hasten death as a normative criterion in
the end-of-life debate
According to traditional Catholic moral theology, it is
beyond doubt that not only killing but also intentionally
allowing someone to die is an evil act per se and can never
be justified, no matter what the circumstances [2, 8].
Some experts hold the view that non-intentionality is an
inherent feature of both passive euthanasia and of with-
holding and withdrawing treatment, so that there can be
no such thing as “intentionally allowing to die” [7, 13].
Whereas the former is clearly a normative judgement, the
latter appears to be more of a factual belief. Neither
statement seems ever to have been discussed in the con-
text of empirical findings.
The data presented in this paper clearly show that the
view that withholding or withdrawing treatment means
allowing patients to die, even though not intending them
to do so, is untenable from an empirical point of view. In
fact, almost every second medical decision to withhold or
withdraw treatment at the end of life is taken with the
explicit intention of hastening death.
Whether this finding has any implications for consid-
ering that intentionally allowing someone to die is a mor-
ally justifiable action poses a different question. In princi-
ple, empirical data cannot answer the question of whether
a normative judgement is right or wrong. However, con-
sidering that non-treatment decisions preceded between
6% (Italy) and 41% (Switzerland) of all deaths in the
EURELD countries [11], the conclusion that intentionally
allowing a hastened death is always morally wrong would
mean disapproval of a considerable number of medical
decisions at the end of life. What we can say is that in the
context of withholding and withdrawing treatment there is
great divergence between the traditional moral rule and
today’s medical practice.
This does not necessarily mean that the doctrine of
double effect is of no use in separating the acceptable
from the unacceptable in medical end-of-life decisions. It
has been argued that with active measures (indirect and
direct active euthanasia) this doctrine is still absolutely
meaningful, whereas the primary consideration with non-
treatment decisions/passive euthanasia is the difference
between action and omission [14]. Applying the rule of
double effect in combination with the actions and omis-
sions principle could therefore still serve a useful purpose
in the field of medical end-of-life decisions. This is also
the legal position in most westernized countries today,
except in the Netherlands and Belgium [15]. However, if
actively hastening death can be allowed (in indirect eutha-
nasia), and intentionally hastening death can be allowed
(in passive euthanasia), the question remains of what is so
problematic about their combination [14]. And a few
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authors have even challenged the normative relevance of
the difference between action and omission [16].
Study limitations
There are several limitations to this type of empirical
study, as we have pointed out earlier [5, 11]. Bias invoked
by non-response or by considerations of social acceptabil-
ity cannot be excluded. Another limitation concerns the
recollection of doctors who are asked to note down details
of a patient who died several weeks/months previously.
There are also limitations to a wholly neutral and objec-
tive assessment of practices in such a highly controversial
area, charged as it is with different, sometimes even op-
posed, moral values and convictions. Slight modifications
in the phrasing of the questions, such as “not prolonging
dying” instead of “not prolonging life” might have in
some cases been crucial to whether a doctor perceived the
question as relating to the decision he/she made. Whereas
“hastening the end of life” was used in the EURELD
study as the superordinate concept for medical decisions
with a possible or certain life-shortening effect, corre-
sponding to the German term “Sterbehilfe”, some doctors
might have felt that in withholding/withdrawing treatment
they intended to avoid prolonging life but not to shorten it
[17]. This view is based on the idea that there is a natural-
ly allotted life-span, after which the use of life-saving and
life-sustaining measures becomes prolonging life. As the
application of this concept might be highly subjective
[18], we felt that providing both formulations, as ex-
plained in the methods section, was the best solution.
Finally, we cannot rule out that individual doctors may
have had a different understanding of the word “inten-
tion”. Validation in this area has proved difficult, as hu-
man intention is multilayered, subjective, often ambigu-
ous, and sometimes even contradictory [19].
Conclusions
In almost half the cases, a medical decision to with-
hold or withdraw treatment is taken with the explicit
intention of hastening the end of the patient’s life. No
clear association can be found between doctors’ intentions
and features of the treatment forgone that can be deter-
mined objectively, such as the likelihood and extent of a
death-hastening effect, the immediacy of death, or the
expected burden of any potential life-sustaining measure.
These findings challenge the usefulness of doctors’ inten-
tions with respect to hastening the end of life as criteria
for the moral judgement about decisions to withhold or
withdraw medical treatment.
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